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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It has been argued recently that a crucial aspect of "feasible globalization" is the opening
of international labor markets to allow for temporary economic migration from developing
countries into the more developed ones (Rodrik (2002), Bhagwati(2003)). The expected
income gains from such a liberalization of labor markets is expected to be large and, from
the perspective of developing countries, is underscored by the large fraction of migrant
earnings that are remitted back to families of origin in sending communities.
A question of particular interest in this regard is how such temporary economic migra-
tion is likely to aﬀect private investments in human capital by the poor. Low educational
attainment in many developing countries has been viewed as arising, at least partly, from
barriers to such private investment, located in incomplete or absent credit markets.1 To
the extent that migration releases such resource constraints, it is expected to increase
human capital investment among the poor, thereby also reducing inequalities of opportu-
nity arising from diﬀerential access to education. In a context where gender diﬀerences
in educational attainment are large, as is the case in rural Pakistan, lowering resource
constraints for the poor could also lead to higher investments in schooling for girls and
a reduction in gender inequalities in access to schooling with all its attendant societal
beneﬁts.2
Sociologists have long argued, however, that migration can create other constraints or
change preferences in a direction which dampens or even reverses this potential enhanced
investment. The basic argument is that migration can disrupt family life in any number
of ways. Children in migrant households may, for example, face greater emotional stress,
have less adult supervision, or be required to spend more time on household production or
the care of younger siblings. However, changes in household structure due to sex-speciﬁc
migration may also change the balance of preferences over schooling in another direction.
Migrant households are often female headed in the crucial period when schooling decisions
need to be made. A substantial body of research has identiﬁed important gender diﬀerences
in preferences over the welfare of children and has shown, in particular, that investments
in child education increase signiﬁcantly in contexts where mothers exercise greater control
1See, for example, Jacoby (1994) and Jacoby and Skouﬁas (1997).
2A multitude of development beneﬁts are associated with higher female educational attainment, Studies
show that more educated women tend to have greater labor productivity, lower fertility, better child
outcomes, make better use of health and other community services, and even participate more in the
political process. See, e.g., Summers (1992), Schultz, (1989), Strauss and Thomas (1995), Behrman and
Deolalikar (1995) and Glewwe (1999). In Pakistan, Zia and Bari (1999) identify female illiteracy as a
major obstacle to eﬀective political participation in local government, post decentralization.
1
WPS3945over the use of household resources. These contrary eﬀects could, in principal, have gender
diﬀerentiated impacts and lead to higher or lower net investments in human capital among
children in migrant households.
In this paper, we examine the impact of temporary economic migration by a household
member on investments in child schooling. We are particularly interested in disaggregating
the role of the potentially contrary channels through which migration could inﬂuence
schooling decisions. The data come from rural Pakistan. Temporary economic migration
is quite substantial, with more than one in four rural households reporting at least one
migrant. School enrollment rates also remain relatively low and the rural gender gap in
schooling is large. This makes it a particularly useful context for examining the impact
of migration on gender inequalities in human capital investment. School age children are
also routinely engaged in home or market production so that foregone income from such
activity is the appropriate opportunity cost of time spent in school. We examine this trade-
oﬀ directly by looking at the labor market activity of school age children. A substantial
number of migrant households are also female headed. We can therefore examine how
variations in household structure among migrants inﬂuences schooling choices, and in
particular, how it inﬂuences the gender allocation of labor and schooling among migrant
children.
The literature on migration and human capital investment in origin communities is
small and focused largely on the impact of migration on accumulated schooling (see, for
example, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003), Lopez Cordoba (2004), Yang (2004), Hanson
and Woodruﬀ (2003), deBrauw and Giles (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2005)).
Most of these studies ﬁnd some positive impact of migration on school attainment, but
none looks at the impact of migration on gender inequalities in schooling carefully. Hanson
and Woodruﬀ (2003) ﬁnd that the gains in schooling are greatest for girls in the age group
13-15. McKenzie and Rapoport’s (2005) ﬁnding that 16-18 year old boys in migrant
households have signiﬁcantly fewer years of schooling eﬀectively reduces the gender gap
in schooling among 16-18 year old children, but only via a net reduction in schooling for
boys. We are also not aware of any studies that have looked at the eﬀects of migration
on schooling and labor market outcomes for children simultaneously, or on the eﬀects of
migration induced changes in household structure on child schooling and labor market
participation.3
Since migration can aﬀect child schooling through multiple channels, the paper focuses
3The one possible exception is Joshi (2004), who looks at the eﬀects of household structure in Bangladesh
on child schooling, but does not focus speciﬁcally on migration.
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be very noisy. The main econometric challenge for the paper lies in dealing with the
endogeneity of the migration decision. Migration is not randomly assigned to households
and many of the same characteristics which inﬂuence the decision to migrate are likely to
also aﬀect the household’s ability to invest in schooling, the perceived returns from such
schooling, and the labor market activity of children.
We use two strategies to address this potential endogeneity problem. The ﬁrst is to
identify selection in the migration decision by using instrumental variables. Since any
number of unobserved community characteristics, such as local labor market conditions
or school quality, could aﬀect the returns to schooling and the propensity to migrate, we
need an instrument that varies across households within a village. We use the prevalence
rates of migration in the population, at the village level, as our main instrument for mi-
gration and use a feature of migration that is particular to the context we study to obtain
household level variation in our instrument. Mobility and seclusion restrictions on women
typically require the presence of an adult male in the household. Households with a single
adult male are therefore much less likely to undertake migration. We can therefore inter-
act the village migration network with the number of adult males in a household (males
above age 20) to obtain an instrument which varies at the household level. The identiﬁ-
cation argument, then is that the incidence of migration, at the census level, interacted
with the number of adult males in the household, should aﬀect a household’s opportunity
to send a migrant but is unlikely to be correlated with unobservable household or child
attributes that aﬀect the costs or returns to education, conditional on household demo-
graphic characteristics and village ﬁxed eﬀects to clean out the potential eﬀects of any
time invariant unobserved village characteristics. We show that conditional on appropri-
ate demographic characteristics, the number of adult males exercises no inﬂuence on any
outcome of interest.
Our second strategy is to conﬁne attention to migrant households and to use informa-
tion on the year of initial migration and the child’s age on the survey date to examine
diﬀerences in educational outcomes for siblings, diﬀerentiated by their attained age before
the ﬁrst migration episode for the household. This allows us to exploit the fact that many
schooling decisions are time sensitive and have sustained impacts on educational attain-
ment. For example, in the context we study, children typically begin elementary school at
age 6 or 7 and children who have not initiated formal schooling by age 9 rarely enter the
formal schooling process. We can test, therefore, whether children in migrant households
3
WPS3945who had turned age 9 before the household’s ﬁrst migration episode are less likely to be
enrolled in school as compared to children in their age cohort who were younger than age
9w h e nt h eﬁrst migrant left the household. Similarly, the extent to which children engage
in labor market activity is likely to be codetermined with schooling decisions and therefore
also sensitive to the child’s age at migration.
Finally, still conﬁning attention to migrant households, we ask whether schooling and
labor market outcomes vary signiﬁcantly by female headship and whether we can discern
any gender diﬀerentials in outcomes. Since female headship arises directly from the mi-
gration decision in our sample, we treat female headship as endogenous and use the same
instrument set to identify selection into female headship.
The next section of the paper provides the context for our study and presents some
preliminary evidence on gender diﬀerences in educational attainment and labor market
activity of school age children. Section 3 presents the estimation and identiﬁcation strat-
egy. We test our main propositions in section 4. In 4.1 and 4.2 we use our instrumentation
strategy to examine diﬀerences in educational attainment and labor market activity re-
spectively. In 4.3, we restrict attention to migrant households and examine diﬀerences in
educational attainment and labor among children in migrant households using our second
strategy. In 4.4, we ask whether accounting for female headship among migrant households
yields any further insights. Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a a n d C o n t e x t
2.1 Migration
More than one in four households in rural Pakistan have at least one migrant member.
Migrants are typically adult males, who move temporarily to an international or domestic
urban destination in search of employment leaving their families in the village.4 Most
maintain very close ties with their origin households and communities, returning fre-
quently and sending substantial remittances.5 This makes the context particularly useful
for examining the impact of migration on outcomes in the sending community.
The study uses data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) 2001-02,
which collected detailed information on migration for each household member.6 Complete
4Close to 80% of migrants in our study report having undertaken migration in search of employment.
5See Addleton (1984), Kazi (1989) and Arif (2004) for a review of migration patterns in Pakistan.
6In the PRHS, all individuals who were away from the household at the time of the survey, were
classiﬁed as households members, provided they were regarded as members of the household before they
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provinces. The survey contains detailed household and individual characteristics, including
demographics, occupation, health, education, investments, assets, household expenditure,
and the migration experience of all household members. For migrants, data were also
collected on the year and duration of migration, migration destination, remittances, and
social networks accessed prior to and post migration. Migrants were interviewed directly
when possible. Otherwise, the individual designated as the male head of the household
reported migration and other information for each migrant.
For purposes of the analysis we conﬁne attention to male migrants age 18 or older who
migrated for economic reasons.7 Using this deﬁnition, 977 men (about 15% of all men in
this age range) are classiﬁed as migrants Of these, 32% were back from a migration episode
in the survey year, the rest were current migrants. Since migration is typically recurrent,
a household is classiﬁed as a migrant household if it reported at least one male member
with some migration experience current or past. At the household level, 699 households
(26% of all households) had at least one male migrant.
The median age at ﬁrst migration in the sample is 22. The typical migrant is either a
household head (38%) or an older son of the head (54%). One indicator of the extent to
which migrants are attached to their families of origin in the villages is that over two-thirds
are married and have their spouses and/or children living in the village. Almost two-thirds
of migrants also reported sending some remittances to their families in the village and
three-fourths of those who sent remittances did so on a regular basis.8 The survey has a
companion section on cash and kind transfers received and given by the household, and the
identity of all who send or receive such transfers. The median reported amount remitted
annually by migrant household members is about Rs. 24,000.9 In contrast, transfers by
non-household members are insigniﬁcant.10
left and had not set up a permanant home elsewhere. This enabled collection of all relevant data on current
migrants.
7There is virutally no migration among children under 18. The few who do not live at home move
to join a family member or to attend school in a neighboring rural area. Women also typically migrate
to join family members, most often a spouse.While 8% of reported migrants are women, over 82% report
migrating to join a family member. Only 13 women (1% of the sample of migrants) report migrating for
any economic reason.
8Remittances from international migrants constitute the single largest source of foreign exchange earn-
ings for the country. According to one estimate, US$2.4 billion (or 4% of the country’s GNP) is currently
remitted annually by international migrants (see Gazdar (2003))..
9About $500 annually at the prevailing exchange rate in 2001.
10See Mansuri (2006) for a more extensive discussion of migration destination and remittance ﬂows in
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Results
Most studies that have looked at the impact of migration on child schooling have focused
on accumulated schooling as measured in completed grades. In the context we study,
accumulated schooling is likely to reﬂect the combined eﬀects of several distinct school-
ing decisions since enrollment rates are low, the withdrawal of children from school at
the transition point from elementary to middle school is high, and there is signiﬁcant
participation by children in labor markets. This makes it important to disaggregate the
impact of migration on accumulated schooling by examining schooling outcomes at both
the intensive and extensive margin. We also examine accumulated schooling conditional
on enrollment since this is a better measure of progress through school
We have data on schooling outcomes for 7181 children age 5 to 17 who belong to
2126 households. Of these 29% belong to migrant households. There is wide variation,
in practice, in the age at which children start school. However, very few begin school
after age 10. In examining the school enrollment decision and accumulated schooling,
therefore, we conﬁne attention to children age 11-17 in order to ensure that our estimates
of enrollment or completed grades are robust to potential late entry. In looking at retention
rates, however, we focus on children 10-15, since this is the age group which is most at
risk for dropping out of school during the transition point from primary to middle school.
In looking at completed grades, conditional on current attendance, however, we include
all school age children (5-17).
Overall, 58% of children age 11-17 report having enrolled in school at some point. Of
these, 38% had dropped out of school by the survey year. The bulk of dropouts, over
85%, had dropped out either before or at the end of elementary school.
While these overall rates of enrollment and retention and quite poor, they conceal very
large gender diﬀerences in enrollment and retention rates. In the sample, 58% of girls age
11-17 had never been to school as compared to only 26% for boys in this age range. The
picture only worsens when we look at school retention rates. While only 25% of enrolled
boys in the sample had dropped out by the survey year without completing high school,
44% of enrolled girls were no longer in school. Not surprisingly, boys also have signiﬁcantly
more years of schooling, completing an additional half grade more than girls on average
(p-val .000).
A number of household and community characteristics account for these low overall
rural Pakistan.
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and retention rates typically vary signiﬁcantly with income and the gender gap declines
as income increases. This pattern is evident in Figures 1-6 in the appendix. As wealth
increases, enrollment rates rise and dropout rates decline across the board. The gender
g a pi nb o t ha l s on a r r o w s .a sd o e st h eg a pi nc o m p l e t e dg r a d e s ,a n db o t hb o y sa n dg i r l sd o
equally well in terms of completed grades for age if they remain in school. This suggests
that migration should not only increase school enrollment and retention rates, it should
yield relatively higher beneﬁts for girls. This is indeed borne out in a simple comparison,
by household migration status, of mean enrollment and dropout rates in our sample.
Children in migrant households have higher levels of enrollment and lower dropout rates.
Girls also do better in terms of completed grades (see table A2 in the appendix) and there
is some evidence of smaller gender gaps in all outcomes.
Migration could, in principal, generate countervailing eﬀects on child labor market
activity. The relaxation of credit constraints should reduce participation in the labor
market, while the potential disruption in family life and lack of available adults could
place greater labor demands on the time of school age children, particularly in home
production activities. Fortunately, we can use data on the time spent by children in
household production and wage labor to directly examine this question.
While these simple mean comparisons are only suggestive at this stage, we do not
appear to be in world where the income eﬀect of migration is dampened or reversed by
greater labor demands on the time of school age children due to migration induced family
life disruption.
Nonetheless, we can examine this question directly by looking at the labor market
activity of school age children. We have labor market participation information for 5780
children age 7 to 17 who belong to 1992 sample households. There is data on ﬁve major
categories of work. Work on the family farm, agricultural wage work, work on a family
enterprise or home based productive activity of any kind, non-farm wage work and care
of livestock. For children up to age 13 we also have information on time spent on fetching
ﬁrewood and water. We construct two deﬁnitions of work. The more restrictive deﬁnition
(I) , includes only directly income generating activities. It therefore excludes livestock
care, and the fetching of ﬁrewood and water. The less restrictive deﬁnition (II) includes
all work.
Using the more restrictive deﬁnition, 18% of all children in the age group 7-17 report
11See the Pakistan Country Gender Assessment, Chapter 2, The World Bank. 2005 for an extensive
overview and analysis.
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activity. Interestingly, there appears to be little diﬀerence in reported work activity by
gender. Using an eight hour work day and 30 days of work per month, the median days
worked by children who report some labor market activity is 1.3 months over a one year
period. The average number of days worked is substantially higher at 2 months since there
is a strong positive correlation between age and labor market participation. Again, there
are no discernible gender diﬀerences in days worked. While boys work 12 more days, on
average, per year, this diﬀerence arises entirely from children 16 and older where boys work
for 24 more days per year than girls (p-value<.00). In all other age groups the diﬀerence
is small and insigniﬁc a n t .I fw eu s et h eb r o a d e rd e ﬁnition of work, the labor activity of
c h i l d r e na g e7 - 1 7r i s e st o2 9 % .T h em e d i a nn u m b e ro fd a y sw o r k e da r ec l o s et o2m o n t h s
and the average number of days worked rises to about 3 months.
The principal work activity of children is unpaid work on the family farm. 63% of
working children report working on their own family farms. However, more than a third
(35%) also report working as agricultural wage labor and 13% report working on a family
enterprise. In contrast, only 8% report working as non-farm wage labor. There are strong
gender diﬀerences in the type of work undertaken by male and female children. If we focus
on unpaid family labor, boys are much more likely to work on the family farm (68% of
boys and 58% of girls: p-value <.000), but girls are more likely to work on the household’s
non-farm enterprise (16% of girls and 10% of boys: p-value <.00). If we focus on daily
wage labor instead, girls are much more likely to work as agricultural wage workers (51%
of girls as compared to only 20% of boys: p-value<.0000), while boys are more likely to
work as non-agricultural wage workers (14% of boys but only 2% of girls: p-value <.0000).
These diﬀerences are consistent with other work that has highlighted mobility constraints
for girls, particularly after adolescence.12 Non-agricultural wage work typically requires
travel outside the village, and is often undertaken individually. In contrast, agricultural
wage work is typically undertaken jointly with other family members, particularly other
adult females. Wage labor is largely undertaken by children 14 and older in our sample,
but this is particularly evident for non-farm wage work, which is almost exclusively done
by boys 14 and up.
This pattern is reﬂected in Figures 7-10 (see Appendix). Girls work more than boys
until age 13 if we use deﬁnition I (age 14 if we use deﬁnition II). Girls also bear a sub-
stantially larger burden of work in poorer households. Their participation in labor market
12See the Pakistan Country Gender Assessment, The World Bank (2005)
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and is signiﬁcantly below that for boys in the highest wealth quintile (see ﬁgures 11-14).
As one might expect, there is also a strong negative correlation between school enroll-
ment, school retention and labor market activity. Appendix Table A1 presents diﬀerences
in labor market activity for children in three age groups, diﬀerentiated by whether they
were ever enrolled and whether, conditional on enrollment, they were in school in the
survey year. Children who are enrolled in school are signiﬁcantly less likely to report work
and work fewer days than those who are never enrolled in school and the diﬀerences are
large, particularly for children between the ages of 11 and 17. Children who drop out of
school, are also signiﬁcantly more likely to report some work and work more days than
children who remain in school. This suggests that the opportunity cost of time spent by
children in school is quite substantial, at least for some households, and rises with age, so
that withdrawal from school may be spurred at least in part by the need to allocate this
time to labor market activity.
Table A2 in the appendix focuses on diﬀerences in child labor market activity by the
migration status of the household. Mean comparisons indicate signiﬁcantly lower child
labor market activity in migrant households, with substantially larger eﬀects for girls.
Our discussion so far has focused on three potential channels through which migration
could impact household investments in child schooling: an increase in household income
via remittances, increased risk bearing capacity, and changes in the demand for child labor
time. As we note above, though, in a contexts such as ours, where there is evidence of
strong boy preference, evidence of diﬀerentially better outcomes for girls due to migration
may be capturing the eﬀect of a rather diﬀerent process: Male migration often leaves
women eﬀectively in charge of their households. If women have more benevolent pref-
erences towards their children, and particularly their daughters, then it could be "male
absence", which yields the larger observed beneﬁts for girls.
We deﬁne female headship simply as the absence of an adult male in the household
during the survey year. Using this deﬁnition, almost 12% of sample households can be
classiﬁed as female headed. What is interesting, though, is that virtually all of these are
migrant households. Among non-migrant households, the incidence of female headship is
a meagre 2% as compared to 37% for migrant households. In rural Pakistan, therefore,
female headship is almost exclusively a result of economic migration. We exploit this
feature of our data by conﬁning attention to migrant households and examining the impact
of female headship on child schooling and labor outcomes, and more speciﬁcally, on gender
9
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Given that the average duration of a migration episode is about 8 years and migration
is often recurrent, these women are eﬀectively left in charge of their households for long
stretches of time. Most migrants are also relatively young married men with children, so
these women are also likely to preside over important schooling decisions for their children.
It is this aspect of female headship that is pertinent to the concerns of this paper.
More speciﬁcally, we are interested in whether any evidence we ﬁnd for the protective
eﬀects of migration, particularly for girls, arises, at least in part, due to the substantial
incidence of female headship among migrant households. A substantial body of research
has identiﬁed important gender diﬀerences in preferences over the welfare of children and
has shown, in particular, that investments in child education increase signiﬁcantly in
contexts where mothers exercise greater control over the use of household resources. In
a context such as ours, where women’s ability to make decisions regarding the disposal
of such resources is, otherwise, severely circumscribed, the migration induced absence of
males may well provide mothers with an opportunity to more easily realize their preferences
with regard to investments in their children’s education. The observe eﬀect, of course, is
that economic migration can also be disruptive of family life in any number of ways. As we
note above, the absence of other adult labor, may result in greater pressure on children to
assist with housework, household production or childcare. This creates a potential conﬂict
for female heads between their desire to invest in their children and the greater opportunity
cost of child time in school, with possible consequences for the gender allocation of labor
and schooling. We examine this issue by conﬁning attention to migrant households and
asking whether schooling and labor market outcomes vary signiﬁcantly by female headship
a n dw h e t h e rw ec a nd i s c e r na n yg e n d e rd i ﬀerentials in outcomes.
In our schooling sample, close to 40% of migrant households are in fact female headed,
with either no adult male present (17%) or a very young unmarried adult male (under
21) present in the household (23%). This is in sharp contrast to non-migrant households
where such female headship is virtually absent, with only 3% of households reporting a
female head.
We ﬁnd, in line with other studies, that female headed households are smaller and
have a higher dependency ratio. In our context, migrant males remain closely tied to their
origin households and remittances are typically regular and substantial, particularly where
a wife and or children are left behind. Nonetheless, female headed households do have
signiﬁcantly fewer assets, though they have more inherited land on average than other
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expenditures.
A simple comparison of proportions indicates no diﬀerence in enrollment rates among
migrant households by female headship. However, girls in female headed households are
signiﬁcantly more likely to dropout of school (with dropout rates rising from .25 to .41,
p-val .02). Girls in female headed households are also signiﬁcantly behind in terms of
completed grades (by .58 grades, p-val .02) and conditional on current enrollment they
fall a whole grade behind (p-val .01). There is, in contrast, no eﬀect on boys.
These results indicate that female headship, in the context we study, might serve to
dampen rather than accentuate, the potential positive gains from migration and, moreover,
that girls are likely to bear the greatest burden. Of course, as descriptive statistics, these
are only suggestive. They do, however, anticipate some key results.
3 Econometric Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation
In order to assess the eﬀect of migration on schooling and child labor, we need to estimate
a regression function of the form
Sijv = β1Mijv + β2Bijv + β3BijvMijv + γ
1Cijv + γ2Xjv + ηjv + εijv (1)
Where Sijv is a measure of school attainment for child i,i nh o u s e h o l dj and village v.
Mjv is an indicator of whether the household has a migrant, Bijv is the child’s gender, and
Cijv and Xjv are vectors of exogenous child and household characteristics. The mean zero
error term ηjv captures the eﬀects of unobserved factors common to a given village and
household. The child-speciﬁc error term εijv reﬂects measurement error in our schooling
variables and, potentially, unobserved attributes of the child, including innate ability, or
parental preferences which vary by child gender. The key diﬀerence between ηjv and εijv
is of course that while the latter is not likely to be correlated with the migration decision,
the former could inﬂuence both the decision to migrate and investments in human capital
formation. At the village level, ηjv may, for example, include unobserved variation in local
labor market conditions or in school quality, while at the household level, it could include
preferences over human capital accumulation, access to credit or insurance markets or
costs that aﬀect schooling but are not observed in the data.
Regardless, since Mjv i sl i k e l yt od e p e n do na tl e a s to n eo ft h ef a c t o r sc a p t u r e db yηjv,
we need to contend with a potential endogeneity problem. We tackle the problem in two
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correlated with the migration decision but uncorrelated with unobserved attributes of the
household or the community.
A number of recent papers have used a measure of the migrant network to instrument
for migration. Migrant networks are seen as reducing the costs of migration for potential
migrants via two channels First, they constitute an information network which can educate
potential migrants about conditions in speciﬁc migration destinations as well as potential
hazards and costs, both at home and in migration destinations (Massey 1988; Orrenious
(1999)). Second, they serve to relax credit constraints (Genicot and Senesky (2004)).
A number of studies have also shown that networks increase the economic returns to
migration (Munshi (2003); McKenzie (2005)). All of this implies that the probability
of migration should be higher for households residing in communities with signiﬁcant
migration experience.13
The PRHS 2001-02 includes a complete census of all village households which ascer-
tained the household’s current migration status.14 Using this, we can construct a measure
of the migration network for each village in our sample as the proportion of households in
the village with a current migrant. While this census based measure of migrant networks
is unlikely to be correlated with household speciﬁc unobservables in ηjv,t h i si so fc o u r s e
not the case for any number of village level unobservables which could well be corrrelated
with both the propensity to migrate at the village level and village average child outcomes.
In order to deal with this problem, we need an instrument which varies at the household
level.
Fortunately, a feature of migration that is particular to the context we study, provides
us with such household level variation in the opportunity to migrate. Mobility and seclu-
sion restrictions on women typically require the presence of an adult male in the household.
Indeed, households without an adult male are a rare feature among non-migrants in rural
Pakistan (less than 3%). Households with a single adult male are therefore much less
13This is indeed borne out in several empirical studies. For example, Winters et. al. (2001) show that the
probability of migration to the United States is higher for households living in Mexican communities which
have greater experience with migration. Banerjee (1991) and Caces(1986) have shown the importance of
networks in the rural-urban migration decision in the Indian and Philippine context respectively. Ilahi and
Jafarey (1999), have shown the importance of extended family networks in ﬁnancing migration costs in
Pakistan.
14In the census,14% of households report a current migrant. This is signiﬁcantly below the migration
incidence we get from the household survey since the latter is not restricted to current migrants. It is
worth noting that the number of households in the sample with a current migrant is just above 13%, as
we would expect from the census.
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in the household could also aﬀect child schooling and labor through their aﬀect on house-
hold income or the presence of adults who can supervise or otherwise provide guidance to
children with schoolwork etc. We show however, that conditional on appropriate house-
hold demographic characteristics and a measure of inherited land wealth, which is clearly
independent of the migration decision,15 t h en u m b e ro fa d u l tm a l e si nt h eh o u s e h o l dh a s
no residual impact on any outcomes of interest.
We can therefore interact the number of adult males in the household (males above
age 20), NAjv,with our migrant network instrument to obtain a set of instruments that
vary across households within a village. Using this instrument set, we can diﬀerence
out any time invariant characteristics of the village and conﬁne attention to diﬀerences
in educational attainment among migrant and non-migrant children within each village,
conditional on household demographic structure and inherited wealth.
Diﬀerencing equation 1 across households within a village, yields
Sij = β1Mj + β2Bij + β3BijMj + γ
1Cij + γ2Xj + ζij (2)
where ζij = ηj + εij.
Our principal instrument for Mj in equation 2 is therefore a measure of the village
migrant network (VM v) interacted with the number of adult males in the household
(NAj). Additional instruments are constructed by interacting NAj with the village land
gini (VG ).16 These two instruments are interacted with the child’s gender in order to
estimate β3.
The set of exogenous child characteristics, Cijv, include the child’s gender, age and
age squared, mother’s and father’s level of education (in completed grades), the number
of other school age siblings (age 6-17); the number of siblings age 5 or younger, also inter-
acted with the child’s gender in order to to ascertain any gender diﬀerences in child care
responsibilities, and the presence of an older brother or sister under age 18. The rationale
for this last set of variables is that children who have older siblings may be less likely to be
r e m o v e df r o ms c h o o li nt h ee v e n to fa nu n e x p e c t e di n c o m el o s so rh a v ef e w e rh o u s e h o l d
production related responsibilities. The set of exogenous household level characteristics,
Xjv, includes a further set of demographic controls, speciﬁcally, an indicator for whether
15Since land is primarily inherited in rural Pakistan, concerns about changes in land distribution due to
migration are unwarranted.
16The direct eﬀect of any village level observables has already been removed using the village ﬁxed eﬀect
and we control for the household’s own land holdings directly in the second stage.
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hold and the household dependency ratio. It also includes the household’s inherited land









0 should hold to a
reasonable approximation.
Since we get identiﬁcation substantially from household level variation in NAj,o n c ew e
clean out the eﬀects of village level unobservables, we present, for each schooling outcome,
one speciﬁcation, without village ﬁxed eﬀects, which includes the number of adult males
in the household in the second stage. In all cases, the eﬀect of including NAj is negligible.
It always fails to attract a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient and the F-statistic on the instrument set
is essentially unchanged (see Tables 1-5, speciﬁcation 3).17
Our second strategy for dealing with the potential endogeneity of the migration de-
cision is to restrict attention to migrant households and use information on the year of
migration and child age to look at diﬀerences in schooling and labor outcomes of siblings
classiﬁed by their age in the year of migration. This allows us to exploit the fact that
many schooling decisions are time sensitive and have sustained impacts on educational
attainment. However, diﬀerences in schooling outcomes for siblings in the two groups
should be free of any bias due to time invariant household level unobservables, including
the determinants of the migration decision.
To examine the impact of migration on school enrollment, children who were 9 or older
before the ﬁrst migrant left the household are placed in group I and children who were
younger than 9 in the year of ﬁrst migration are placed in group II. The rationale for using
9a st h ec u t - o ﬀ point is that decisions regarding child school enrollment are more or less
made by age 10 in the context we study. The dependent variable is, as above, an indicator
for whether the child was ever enrolled in school. The main migration variable is now the
child speciﬁc group indicator ABMij which takes the value 1 if the child is in group I. Let
us suppose, for the sake of exposition, that we have a sample consisting of two children,
one in group I (ABMij =1 ) and the other in group II (ABMkj =0 ). In this case, the ﬁrst
diﬀerence estimator is identical to the household ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (which we use in
17To the extent that the size or quality of the migration network inﬂuences not just current migration,
but also the future migration prospects of children and thus investments in education, it is possible that
the exclusion restriction on the village migrant network is not valid. This poses no problem as far as the
schooling decisions of girls are concerned, since women do not migrate, except through marriage, in our
context.
Regardless, though, our instrumentation strategy deals with this issue as well since we use village ﬁxed
eﬀects to clean out the direct eﬀect of all village level variables, including the village migrant network.
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children within a household, yields
∆Sj = β1ABMj + β2∆Bj + β3∆BjMj + γ1∆Cj + ∆εj (3)
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator and ∆ABMj = ABMij.T h eO L Se s t i m a t e so fβ
1,β2
and β3 from this regression will be consistent provided that E [ABMij∆εj]=0 .18 Note
t h a tw h i l ew eh a v ed i ﬀerenced out any time invariant household unobservables, it is con-
ceivable that a time varying unobservable, such as an idiosyncratic shock, may have in-
ﬂuenced the timing of migration as well as the educational outcomes of group I siblings
in the household. Since we are interested in precisely this aspect of migration, i.e., its
capacity to release credit constraints, this presents no problem.
4M a i n R e s u l t s
Tables 1-5 present the estimation results for the three measures of school attainment and
the two measures of child labor, respectively. Both measures of labor market activity
use the more restrictive deﬁnition of work. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in all cases (column
1) presents the OLS estimates of the migration coeﬃcient and its interaction with child
gender under the assumption that the migration decision is uncorrelated with unobserved
village and household attributes. The full set of controls (see Appendix Table A3) are
included in this speciﬁcation.
In speciﬁcation 2 we relax the assumption that the migration decision is uncorrelated
with unobserved household characteristics which could inﬂuence schooling choices. Since
the endogeneity bias in the migration coeﬃcient could work in either direction, we have
no priors on the direction of the bias. The instrument in this speciﬁcation is the village
migration network and its interaction with child gender. The explanatory power of the
instruments, conditional on the included household and child characteristics, is extremely
high in all cases. The coeﬃcient estimates for the full set of controls for this speciﬁcation
i sp r e s e n t e di nA p p e n d i xT a b l eA 3 .
In speciﬁcation 3, we add the number of adult males to the set of controls. It fails
to attract a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient and the strength of the instruments is unaﬀected. This
conﬁrms that the number of adult males exercises no residual inﬂuence on schooling or
18Note that since ηjv diﬀerences out of this equation, we do not need to be concerned about the possibility
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demographic controls included in the second stage.
Speciﬁcation 4 presents the OLS estimates with village ﬁxed eﬀects. As expected,
cleaning out unobserved village characteristics reduces the eﬀect of migration on all three
schooling outcomes, indicating that part of the observed migration eﬀect arises from village
level unobservables.
Speciﬁcation 5 presents IV estimates with village ﬁxed eﬀects. The joint explanatory
power of our instruments, conditional on the village ﬁxed eﬀect and included household
and child characteristics, is high in all cases. The instruments also easily pass the overi-
dentiﬁcation test. All statistics are reported at the end of each table. The ﬁrst stage is
reported in appendix table A3 for the school enrollment.
In Table 3, speciﬁcation 6 checks for any migration induced changes in returns to
schooling among high school age children. Speciﬁcation 7 examines accumulated schooling,
conditional on having enrolled in school, and speciﬁcation 8 examines progress through
school among children, age 5-17, conditional on current enrollment.
The control variables are jointly signiﬁcant and three facts stand out. First, parental
e d u c a t i o na n di n h e r i t e dw e a l t hb o t hh a v eap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on enrollment as expected.
Second, extended families have a negative eﬀect on enrollment and three, the total number
of siblings of school age has a positive eﬀect on enrollment while the number of siblings
0-5 does not appear to have any signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on enrollment.
4.1 School Enrollment, Dropout Rates and Accumulated Grades for Age
The migration eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant for all three schooling outcomes. Children
in migrant households are not only more likely to attend school, they are also more likely
to stay in school in the age range when school dropout rates are at their peak levels, have
higher completed grades in their age cohort and progress through school at a rate that is
signiﬁcantly better than their counterparts in non-migrant households in the same village.
Accounting for selection into migration only strengthens these results indicating that the
selection bias is negative.
We also ﬁnd evidence to support migration induced gender diﬀerentials in enrollment
rates, school retention and progress through school. Enrollment rates increase by 54% for
girls in migrant households (from .35 to .54). In comparison, being in a migrant household
raises enrollment rates for boys by only 7% (from .73 to .78). As a result, the gender gap
in enrollment rates in migrant households is quite a bit smaller (at .24 as compared to
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higher to being with, one might argue that raising the enrollment rates for girls should
be easier. Even in this respect, though, the gains for girls are larger. The increase in
enrollment closes the gap relative to 100% enrollment by 29% for girls, compared to 19%
for boys.
The decline in dropout rates is also substantially larger for girls. The dropout rate for
girls falls by 55% (from .56 to .25), while it declines by 44% for boys (from .25 to .14).
As a consequence the gender gap in dropout rates falls sharply (from .31 to .11). Once
again this implies that for girls the gap from 0 dropout rates is closed by 70% while for
boys this gap is closed by 44%.
Turning next to accumulated years of schooling, unconditional on past or current
enrollment, the gender diﬀerential is rather small. Girls in migrant households have about
1.5 more years of schooling compared to their counterparts in non-migrant households in
the same village, while boys have about a grade more. Signiﬁcantly though, prospects of
migration in the future do not appear to exercise any eﬀect on years of schooling for either
boys or girls. (Table 3, speciﬁcation 6).
When we look at accumulated schooling, conditional on having attended school at some
point (table 3, speciﬁc a t i o n7 ) ,w eg e tl a r g ed i ﬀerences in outcomes for girls and boys. In
fact, comparing children in migrant households, we ﬁnd that girls actually exceed boys in
absolute terms, completing about a ﬁfth of a grade more. The increase in accumulated
schooling for girls is also larger than for boys if we compare children in migrant households
with those in non-migrant households. While girls in migrant households complete almost
2 grades more than girls in non-migrants households, boys complete a little less than a
grade more than boys in non-migrant households. The net eﬀect is that in non-migrant
households, boys are almost a full grade ahead of girls in their age cohort, while in migrant
households, girls more than make up the gap, exceeding boys in their age cohort by .2
grades. Restricting the sample further by conditioning on current enrollment (table 3,
speciﬁcation 8) strengthens these eﬀects further.
Since there is no gender diﬀerence in the average age in ﬁrst grade, our evidence
suggests either a disproportionate beneﬁt to girls from improved household capacity to
bear income risk or a higher incidence of migration generated burdens on boys. The
latter is certainly plausible in the context of rural Pakistan, where migration induced
male absence may imply greater reliance on boys for any number of activities that women
and girls cannot undertake due to seclusion related restrictions on their mobility. We turn
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4.2 Child Labor Market Participation and Days Worked
Migration has a strong dampening eﬀect on child labor market participation, regardless
of whether we look at an indicator for whether the child works or the reported number
of days worked over the survey year. Overall, days worked fall by about 66% (from 27
to 10 for boys and 27 to 9 for girls) (Tables 4 and 5). Unlike all three measures of
schooling, however, there are no gender diﬀerentials in labor market activity. Children
in non migrant households work about 27 days over the period of a year, and migration
reduces labor market activity for both boys and girls by roughly the same number of
days, though boys are more likely to report some work. Interestingly, the presence of
older siblings is signiﬁcant and reduces labor market activity for both boys and girls (see
Appendix Table A3). Finally, accounting for selection into migration serves to strengthen
the migration eﬀect substantially, suggesting, again, that there is signiﬁcant negative
selection into migration.19
While these results are consistent with our results on schooling, given the strong neg-
ative correlation with school attainment and labor market activity, they do not suggest
that the poorer performance of boys in school retention or accumulated schooling can be
ascribed to increased labor market activity. Of course, the increased work burden may
come from increased responsibilities for domestic activities and home production that are
captures poorly in the data.
Although these results are strong, the IV estimates we present above cannot really ac-
count for the time sensitivity of educational investments. In particular, we cannot separate
the impact of migration among children within a household. However, in reality such dif-
ferences must be important if our argument is correct. Children who have already reached
an age beyond which school enrollment is unlikely before the ﬁrst migration episode for
the household or who have been withdrawn from school due to resource constraints prior
to migration are unlikely to catch up to children whose crucial schooling decisions were
made post migration and the ensuing increase in resource ﬂows. To this extent, our IV
estimates are thus likely to understate the true impact of migration on schooling. To
examine these diﬀerences more carefully, we now turn to our second strategy.
19This eﬀect only increases if we use the less restrictive deﬁnition of work (not reported here) and, again
both boys and girls appear to gain equally on average. For days worked per year, IV estimation of the
migration eﬀect with tobit and tehsil ﬁxed eﬀects (not reported here) generated very similar results.
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We classify sample children into two groups by their attained age before the ﬁrst migration
episode for the household. We group children by whether they were 9 or older before the
ﬁrst migrant left the household (group I) or younger than 9 (group II) for all schooling and
labor market outcomes, except accumulated grades for age, where we group children by
the average reported age in grade 1. This accounts for both delayed entry into schooling
as well as any interrupted schooling, since we cannot disaggregate these in the data.
Speciﬁcally, we group children by whether they had turned 7 or older before the ﬁrst
migration episode of the household.
For each outcome, we also report results from a village ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. While
this is more restrictive, it is likely to be more eﬃcient given our sample size once we conﬁne
attention to migrant households. In the case of school dropout rates, we report only this
speciﬁcation since we are unable to compare siblings since we now need to further restrict
the sample to children who have enrolled in school at some point
For enrollment and accumulated schooling, the sample includes all children in migrant
households age 11 or older at the time of the survey. For school retention we enlarge the
sample to include children age 10, since conditional on enrollment, we no longer need to
worry about late entry into schooling. We do the same for both labor market outcomes,
but constrain the sample to focus only on children in the age range 10-16 since by age 17,
a large fraction of boys are working and girls are getting married.20
There are 891 children in 388 households who were age 11 or older at the time of the
survey and 36% of them fall into group I. Every age cohort has at least 24% of such
children though there is some increase in the proportion of children in group II in the
older age cohorts as one might expect. There is no diﬀerence, however, in the proportion
of children ever enrolled in school by age.
The results with household ﬁxed eﬀects are presented in Table 6. The main variables
of interest are the group indicator which takes the value 1 if the child is in group I, and its
interaction with child gender. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for enrollment using
village and household ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. As before migration has a strong positive
eﬀect on enrollment, and this eﬀect more than doubles when we move from a comparison of
migrant children within a village to a comparison of siblings. Among siblings, enrollment
20Including the 17 years olds, has little eﬀect on the odds of working, but the gender diﬀerence in days
worked disppapears for children in group I. Using the more generous deﬁnition of work, increases the size
of the eﬀect but the results are qualitatively unchanged.
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.81 to .93) The net eﬀect is a very substantial narrowing of the gender gap from .41 to
.27. Again, migration not only has a positive impact on enrollment, overall, it generates
a substantial catch up eﬀe c ti ne n r o l l m e n tf o rg i r l s .
We turn next to school retention, conditional on enrollment. The group indicator now
identiﬁes all children who were 10 or older before ﬁr s tm i g r a t i o na n dw e r et h u sl e s sl i k e l yt o
beneﬁt from changes in household resources or preferences towards schooling, particularly
for girls. The sample consists of 770 children in 92 villages. 24% of these children are in
group I and every age cohort has at least 10% of such children, most have about 20%.
Given the smaller sample, we use the more restrictive village ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation
only.
School retention rates for girls rise dramatically after migration. While 55% of girls age
10-17 in group I dropped out of school, only 39% of girls who turned 9 after ﬁrst migration
dropped out. In comparison, there is no change in the dropout rate for boys before and
after migration. Once again, this closes the gender gap in retention rates substantially.
We also ﬁnd support for our results on accumulated schooling. Unconditional on
enrollment, both boys and girl have signiﬁcantly more grades for their age after migration,
and once again, girls do a little better, but not signiﬁcantly so, gaining 1.4 grades over
their siblings in group I while boys gain about a grade. Note that boys remain ahead by
a full grade when we restrict comparison to siblings.
Having found further and stronger evidence in support of our earlier results on school-
ing, we turn now to examining whether there are diﬀerences in labor market participation
rates and work burden among same sex siblings who are diﬀerentiated by their age relative
to the year of ﬁrst migration for the household. We again use age 9 as the cut-oﬀ point
since school enrollment and labor market participation are, as one might expect, strongly
negatively correlated. There are 963 children age 10 and up in 402 migrant households.
Almost a third of this sample (31%) had turned age 9 before ﬁrst migration21 and every
age cohort has at least 15% of such children.
Focusing ﬁrst on labor market participation, we ﬁnd that 29% of girls and 24% of boys
who had turned 9 or older before ﬁrst migration, report some labor market activity. As
before, post migration, labor market activity drops for both boys and girls (p-value<.00).
However, now we get sharply divergent rates of decline for girls and boys. Only 6% of
girls who turned 9 after ﬁrst migration report any work. This represents a 79% decline in
21Overall, there are slighly more boys in this group (33% of boys and 29% of girls are in this sample).
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for boys. This gender diﬀerential in labor market participation is also visible when we use
days worked instead of a dichotomous measure of work. Moreover, as with labor market
participation, the decline is much larger for girls. Since days worked are more likely to be
subject to measurement error as compared to the simpler dichotomous measure, and we
have a much smaller sample, we use log of days worked when comparing siblings.
These results suggest that migration reduces the work burden of girls to a much greater
degree than it does for boys. Of course these results may overstate the work beneﬁts of
migration for girls. Our measures of work do not include housework or child care, activities
in which girls are much more likely to be involved. Nonetheless, their weaker participation
in income related activities clearly reduces their overall work burden and suggests that
migration induced "male absence" increases the opportunity cost of time spent in school
for boys to a greater degree than for girls? If so, this could explain some of the observed
gender diﬀerential in schooling outcomes. An alternative hypothesis is that "male absence"
generates larger gains for girls due to the more benevolent preferences of mother’s towards
their daughters. Of course, both forces may simultaneously be at work. We now turn to
this question.
4.4 Does Female Headship Matter?
Tables 7 and 8 present the estimation results. The main variables of interest are an indi-
cator for whether the household is female headed and the interaction of this indicator with
child gender. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is OLS with village ﬁxed eﬀects. The second speciﬁ-
cation treats female headship as endogenous. Although female headship emerges almost
exclusively in the context of migration, unobserved household or community character-
istics, such as family or community norms around female seclusion could well determine
both schooling outcomes and female headship. Fortunately, our instruments for migration
vary at the household level and, plausibly, also inﬂuence the prospects of female head-
ship in the event of migration. As before, we also diﬀerence out any unobserved village
characteristics that could inﬂuence schooling decisions.
The joint explanatory power of our instruments, conditional on the village ﬁxed eﬀect
and included household and child characteristics, is very high in all cases. The instruments
also easily pass the overidentiﬁcation test. (all statistics reported at the end of each table).
All speciﬁcations include the full set of child and household characteristics described earlier
(see Appendix Table 4 for coeﬃcient estimates for the IV speciﬁcation and the ﬁrst stage
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The results are somewhat surprising. First, female headship has no additional eﬀect
on school enrollment for either boys or girls. Second, while boys in female headed migrant
households are signiﬁcantly less likely to drop out as compared to boys in male headed
migrant households, with dropout rates declining from .18 to .06, girls in such households
do much worse than girls in male headed migrant households, with dropout rates increasing
from .27 to .50. In fact, girls in female headed migrant households fare little better
than girls in non-migrant households! Moreover, while female headship has no eﬀect on
completed grades for boys, it has a large negative eﬀe c to ng i r l s .I nf a c t ,g i r l si nf e m a l e
headed migrant households do about as well in progressing through school as girls in
non-migrant households!
Finally, both boys and girls work substantially more in female headed households (24
days as compared to about 16 days for children in male headed migrant households). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that "male absence" can increase the work burden of
children in migrant households. However, there is no diﬀerential increase in the work
burden of boys, male absence appears to aﬀect both boys and girls equally, in this respect.
These results are essentially unchanged if we use the less restrictive deﬁnition of work.
In sum, our results suggest that girls do much better in male headed migrant house-
holds. This may be because the higher opportunity cost of child time in female headed
households, falls disproportionately on girls. Our estimates suggest that girls work about
as much as boys on income related activities, but this implies a much greater total work
burden since our measures of work do not include housework or child care, activities in
which girls are much more likely to be engaged.
5 Conclusions
The paper ﬁnds evidence of a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of migration on school attainment
and child labor market activity in rural Pakistan. The evidence suggests that children in
migrant households are not only more likely to attend school, they are also more likely to
stay in school and accumulate more years of schooling in comparison to their counterparts
in non-migrant households in the same village. They are also less likely to be involved in
economic work and report working for substantially fewer hours.
The paper also ﬁnds support for large gender diﬀerentials in the gains from migration,
with relative gains for girls outstripping those for boys by a good margin, with a substantial
22
WPS3945net reduction in gender inequalities in access to education.
We account for selection into migration using two strategies. We use a census measure
of village migration prevalence rates and obtain within village variation in this measure
by interacting it with the number of adult males in the household, which, in the context
we study, is a strong predictor of migration. This allows us to clean out any unobserved
community characteristics, such as local labor market conditions or school quality, which
could aﬀect the returns to schooling and the propensity to migrate. Our results indicate
negative selection into migration.
Our second strategy is to conﬁne attention to migrant households and to use informa-
tion on the year of initial migration and the child’s age on the survey date to examine
diﬀerences in educational outcomes for siblings, diﬀerentiated by their attained age be-
fore the ﬁrst migration episode for the household. This allows us to exploit the fact that
many schooling decisions are time sensitive and have sustained impacts on educational
attainment. A comparison of siblings using this strategy further corroborates our results
on school attainment and child labor activity.
Finally we ask whether the evidence we ﬁnd for the protective eﬀects of migration,
and its disproportionate beneﬁt for girls, in particular, arises, at least in part, due to the
substantial incidence of female headship among migrant households. It has been argued
that a woman’s ability to make decisions regarding the disposal of household resources is
a key determinant of child outcomes. It is reasonable to ask therefore if the migration
induced absence of males provides mothers with an opportunity to more easily realize their
preferences with regard to investments in their children’s education. Of course this must
be balanced against the potential disruptive eﬀect of migration on family life. We examine
this issue by conﬁning attention to migrant households and asking whether schooling and
labor market outcomes vary signiﬁcantly by female headship, and whether we can discern
any gender diﬀerentials in outcomes.
Our results are quite surprising. Female headship appears to protect boys at the cost
of girls. Girls in such households are signiﬁcantly more likely to dropout and they lose
most of the beneﬁts of migration on accumulated schooling as well. We cannot ﬁnd direct
support for this eﬀect in the work burden of girls since both boys and girls work more in
female headed migrant households and work about as much. However, we do not have
data on domestic work or child care, which may place a much larger burden on girls in
female headed households. In sum, our results suggest that female headship is not the
source of the migration eﬀects we observe in our data. Rather, it seems to put households
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WPS3945Table 1: School Enrollment Rates (Age 11-17) 
 (1)  (2)
a (3)
a (4)   (5)
 a
 OLS  IV  IV  OLS  IV 
Migrant Household  0.15*** 0.34***  0.35***  0.06**  0.18** 
  [0.04]  [0.09]  [0.09] [0.02] [0.09] 
Migrant Household*Boy  -0.03 -0.11  -0.11  -0.03  -0.12* 
  [0.04]  [0.09]  [0.09] [0.03] [0.07] 
Boy  0.31***  0.35***  0.35*** 0.32*** 0.38*** 
  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] 
Number of Adult Males     -0.01     
Test of  IV relevance   594.8  551.6    164.4 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-value        .10 
Sample Size  3327 3279 3279  3327  3249 
F for MHH (No. of inst.)    74.1 (2)  62.7 (2)    46.0   (4) 
F for MHH*boy (No. of inst.)    60.2 (2)  60.5 (2)    113.4 (4) 
Village Fixed Effects  No No No  Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child has ever enrolled in school.  The full set 
of controls is described in appendix table A3.   
a:  Migrant household endogenous. Instrument set: village migrant network in columns 2 and 3 and 
village migrant network and village land gini interacted with the number of adult males in the 











WPS3945Table 2: School Dropout Rates (Age 10-15) 
 (1)  (2) 
a (3)
a (4)   (5)
a
  OLS IV  IV OLS IV 
Migrant Household  -0.11***  -0.19*** -0.18** -0.08** -0.31** 
  [0.04] [0.07] [0.08] [0.04] [0.15] 
Migrant Household*Boy  0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.07  0.21** 
  [0.05] [0.10] [0.10] [0.05] [0.09] 
Boy  -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.26*** -0.31*** 
  [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] 
Number of Adult Males     -0.02    
     [0.01]    
Test of  IV relevance    326.7 299.9   66.9 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-value    .81   .74 
1824  Sample Size  1860 1840 1840 1860 
17.3 (4)  F for MHH (No. of 
instruments)    65.1 (2)  65.1 (2)   
71.1 (4)  F for MHH*boy (No. of 
instruments)    74.2 (2)  74.2 (2)   
Village Fixed Effects     Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child has dropped out of school, 
conditional on having attended at some point. The full set of controls is described in appendix 
table A3.  
a:  Migrant household endogenous. Instrument set: village migrant network and village land 
gini interacted with the number of adult males in the household.  
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WPS3945Table 3: Accumulated Years of  Schooling  









      








  OLS IV  IV OLS IV IV IV IV 
Migrant 
Household 
(MHH) 0.50***  1.13***  1.09***  0.18 1.43*** 1.82**  1.65** 1.77*** 
  [0.17] [0.39]  [0.42] [0.14] [0.55] [0.85] [0.71] [0.49] 
Migrant 
Household*B
oy  -0.07 -0.45  -0.44 -0.09 -0.39 0.15  -0.92**  -1.17*** 
  [0.21] [0.43]  [0.42] [0.17] [0.37] [0.59] [0.47] [0.33] 
Boy  1.35*** 1.50***  1.50*** 1.42*** 1.55***  1.75***  0.68***  0.74*** 
  [0.13] [0.19]  [0.19] [0.12] [0.16] [0.25] [0.24] [0.19] 
Number of  
Adult Males     0.04    
 
  
     [0.05]         
Test of  IV 
relevance    594.8  551.6  
154.6  88.1 74.8 84.6 
Over-id. test 
2 χ  p-value       
.81 .18 .49 .29 
Sample Size  3327 3279  3279 3327 3248 1764 1909 1923 
F for MHH  
(No. of inst.)    74.1 (2)  62.7 (2)   
39.8  (4)  22.7 (4)  18.9  (4)  21.5 (4) 
F for MHH*boy 
(No. of inst.)    60.2 (2)  60.5 (2)   
152.5 (4)  82.9 (4)  63.9 (4)  67.9 (4) 
Village Fixed 
Effects No  No    No  Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is the number of completed grades in the survey year. The full set of controls is described in 
appendix table A3.  
a: Migrant household endogenous . Instrument set: village migrant network in columns 2 -3 and village migrant network 
and village land gini interacted with the number of adult males in the household in column 5-7. 
b: conditional on having attended school 






WPS3945Table 4: Child Wage and Non-Wage Labor (Age 7-17) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)
a (4)   (5)
 a
 OLS  IV  IV  OLS  IV 
Migrant Household  -0.06***  -0.26***  -0.26*** -0.04** -0.26*** 
  [0.02]  [0.07]  [0.08] [0.02] [0.07] 
Migrant Household*Boy  0.04* 0.08  0.08  0.04*  0.08** 
  [0.02]  [0.07]  [0.07] [0.02] [0.04] 
Boy  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] 
Number of Adult Males     0     
     [0.01]     
Test of  IV relevance   580.8  323.4    190.4 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-value        .49 
Sample Size  5867 5775 5775  5867  5725 
F for MHH (No. of inst.)    56.5 (2)  50.9 (2)    46.8 (4) 
F for MHH*boy (No. of inst.)    35.0 (2)  35.4 (2)    185.8 (4) 
Village Fixed Effects  No No No  Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child has done any work over the past year. It 
includes all wage labor as well as work on household production. The full set of controls is described 
in appendix table A3.  
a: Migrant household endogenous . Instrument set: village migrant network in columns 2 -3 and 
village migrant network and village land gini interacted with the number of adult males in the 
household in column 5. 
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Table 5: Days Worked by Children (Age 7-17) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)
a (4)   (5)
 a
 OLS  IV  IV  OLS  IV 
Migrant Household  -5.54*** -18.78***  -18.58***  -3.99**  -18.27*** 
  [1.89]  [5.23]  [5.42] [1.63] [6.59] 
Migrant Household*Boy  1.78  1.16  1.11 1.17 1.69 
  [2.09]  [5.64]  [5.64] [2.04] [2.88] 
Boy  -0.26 -0.18  -0.16  -0.15  0.33 
  [1.77]  [2.71]  [2.70] [1.44] [1.91] 
Number of Adult Males     -0.25     
     [0.66]     
Test of  IV relevance   852.5  807.2    190.4 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-value        .13 
Sample Size  5867 5775 5775  5867  5725 
F for MHH (No. of inst.)    56.5 (2)  50.9 (2)    46.9 (4) 
F for MHH*boy (No. of inst.)    35.0 (2)  35.4 (2)    185.8 (4) 
Village Fixed Effects  No No No  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
The dependent variable is the number of days worked by children over the survey year. It includes all 
wage labor as well as work on household production. The full set of controls is described in appendix 
table A3.  
a: Migrant household endogenous. Instrument set: village migrant network and village land gini 
interacted with the number of adult males in the household.  
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WPS3945Table 6: A Comparison of Siblings in Migrant Households – Age 11-17 








b Any Work 
a   Days Worked 
ac
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age Before 
Migration  -0.11** 
-
0.26***  0.16*** -0.57** 
-
1.42***  0.10*** 0.23*** 0.42*** 0.97*** 
  [0.05] [0.09] [0.06] (0.26) (0.55)  [0.04] [0.07] [0.15] [0.26] 
Age Before 






0.52***  -0.44** 
  [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] (0.33) (0.39)  [0.05] [0.05] [0.18] [0.21] 
Boy 0.20***  0.27*** 
-
0.15*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.23**  0.30** 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] (0.26) (0.26)  [0.03] [0.03] [0.10] [0.12] 
Sample  Size  881 891 770 891 891 963 963 963 963 
Village Fixed 
Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household 
Fixed  Effects   Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variables are as described in tables 1-5. The full set of controls for specifications 1,3,4,6 and 8 are as 
described in appendix table A3. Specifications 2, 5, 7 and 9 include controls for child’s age and age squared.  
a   9 years or older before first migration 
b   8 years or older before first migration 
c  log of days worked 
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WPS3945Table 7: Child Schooling in Migrant Households. Does Female Headship Matter? 




Grades-Age 5-17  
(conditional on 
current enrollment) 
 (1)  (2)




 OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Female Headed HH  -0.01  0.02  0.24***  0.26** -0.27  -0.12  -0.53**  -0.80** 
 [0.05]  [0.08]  [0.08]  [0.12]  [0.28] [0.43] [0.23]  [0.33] 
Female 
Headed*Boy  0.05 0.07 -0.21**  -0.37*** 0.19 0.26  0.57**  0.66** 
 [0.05]  [0.08]  [0.08]  [0.11]  [0.33] [0.45] [0.24]  [0.31] 
Boy 0.26***  0.25***  -0.18***  -0.12*  1.19***  1.21***  -0.12  -0.14 
 [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.06]  [0.07]  [0.23] [0.26] [0.18]  [0.21] 
Test of  IV relevance   318.2    188.2   366.2   314.6 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-
value 
 .88    .17   .25   .39 
Sample Size  1032 1021  450  424  1032 1021  764  742 
F for MHH (No. of 
inst.) 
    93.1 
(4) 
    52.3 (4)    75.1 
(4) 
    75.9 (4) 




 136.4  (4)   103.2 
(4) 
 184.5  (4) 
Village Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variables are as described in tables 1-3. The full set of controls is described in appendix table A4.  
a:  Female head endogenous. Instrument set: village migrant network and village land gini interacted with the number of 
adult males in the household. 
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Table 8: Child Labor in Migrant Households. Does Female Headship Matter?  
 
Any Work  
(For Wages or 
Household Production) 
Days Worked in 
Preceding Year 
 (1)  (2)
a (3) (4)
a
Female Headed HH  -0.03  0.12**  -1.43  9.57** 
 [0.03]  [0.05]  [2.61]  [4.65] 
Female Headed*Boy  0.02  0.01  -0.47  -1.33 
 [0.03]  [0.04]  [2.95]  [3.81] 
Boy 0  0.01  1.07  1.72 
 [0.02]  [0.03]  [2.18]  [2.41] 
Test of  IV relevance   .18    .74 
Over-id. test  2 χ  p-value   672.9    672.9 
Sample Size   1703    1703 
F for MHH (No. of inst.)    175.0 (4)    175.0 (4) 
F for MHH*boy (No. of inst.)    266.3 (4)    266.3 (4) 
Village Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
The dependent variables are as described in tables 4-5. The full set of controls is 
described in appendix table A4.  
a:  Female head endogenous. Instrument set: village migrant network and village land gini 





  Child Currently in School (conditional on enrollment) 
  Age 7-10  Age 11-13  Age 14-17 
 Yes    No  p-val Yes    No  p-val Yes    No p-val 
Any Work-I
a .04 .04  -  .07 .22  <.000 .23  .41 <.000 
Days worked per 
year-I
a
2 2  -  3  16  <.000  11 31  <.000 
Any Work-II
b .10 .10  -  .17 .32  <.000 .30  .53 <.000 
Days worked per 
year -II
b
7 8  -  12  33  <.000  23 56  <.000 
 
 
Table A1: Labor Market Activity of Children by School Enrollment and Retention 
  Child Ever Enrolled in School (age 7-17) 
  Age 7-10  Age 11-13  Age 14-17 
 Yes    No  p-val Yes    No  p-val Yes    No p-val 
Any Work-I
a .04 .09 <.000  .11 .24 <.000  .32  .42  <.000 
Days worked per 
year-I
a
2 5  <.000 6 14  <.000  21 30  <.000 
Any Work-II
b .10 .20 <.000  .20 .43 <.000  .42  .61  <.000 
Days worked per 
year -II
b
8 16  <.000 17 37  <.000 39  63 <.000 
Notes:  a Includes agricultural and non-agricultural wage work, work on the family farm and on any household 
enterprise, but excludes livestock care and other household tasks (principally collection of firewood and water);   b 
Includes all work  
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WPS3945Table A2: Schooling and Labor Market Activity of Children by Household Migration 
Status (Migrant Household=MHH) 
 Girls  Boys 
 MHH  Non-MHH  p-
value 
MHH Non-MHH  p-value 
Enrollment Rates (11-17)     .56     .35  .000    .86    .69  .000 
Dropout Rates (11-17)      .43     .56  .001    .25    .35  .000 
Accumulated Schooling (5-
17) 
 3.41   3.01  .027   3.81   3.63  .170 
          
Any Work-I
a    .13     .20  .000    .16    .19  .100 
Days worked per year-I
a    .25     .32  .000    .25    .30  .010 
Any Work-II
b  7.00  13.00  .000   8.00  13.00  .001 
Days worked per year -II
b 21.00 30.00 .000  20.00 28.00  .001 
Notes:  a Includes agricultural and non-agricultural wage work, work on the family farm and on 
any household enterprise, but excludes livestock care and other household tasks (principally 
collection of firewood and water);   b Includes all work  
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WPS3945Table A3: Child and Household Characteristics (Tables 1-5) 










  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Age (years)  -0.063  -0.402***  1.808*** -0.032**  -4.833***  -0.035 
  [0.055] [0.091] [0.354] [0.013] [1.361] [0.057] 
Age2 0.002  0.018***  -0.055***  0.003***  0.324***  0.001 
  [0.002] [0.004] [0.013] [0.001] [0.065] [0.002] 
Father's Education   0.028***  -0.009*** 0.113***  -0.003* -0.393**  0.001 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] [0.002] [0.163] [0.002] 
Mother's Education  0.014***  -0.006 0.053**  -0.007**  -0.163 0.002 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.022] [0.003] [0.304] [0.004] 
No. of  Siblings 0-5  0.004  0.011 -0.138***  -0.007 0.233 -0.009 
  [0.016] [0.016] [0.051] [0.008] [0.718] [0.008] 
No. of Siblings 0-5 *Boy  -0.021*  0.001 0.088 0.009  -0.354  -0.003 
  [0.011] [0.020] [0.069] [0.009] [0.849] [0.011] 
No. of Sibling 6-17   0.027**  0.002  0.048  0.007  0.651  0.012** 
  [0.012] [0.009] [0.032] [0.005] [0.462] [0.005] 
Older Boy less than 18  -0.004  0.009  -0.166  0.009  -2.216*  -0.031* 
  [0.008] [0.024] [0.108] [0.009] [1.342] [0.017] 
Older Girl less than 18  0.007  -0.031 -0.057 -0.024*  1.212 0.007 
  [0.023] [0.026] [0.109] [0.014] [1.135] [0.017] 
Dependency Ratio   0.002  -0.011  0.146*  0.017  -1.055  -0.038*** 
  [0.020] [0.016] [0.079] [0.011] [0.720] [0.012] 
Indicator for Joint Family  -0.077*** 0.032 -0.405*** -0.011 0.693  -0.058*** 
  [0.022] [0.024] [0.099] [0.009] [1.497] [0.018] 
Inherited Land  0.001**  -0.001*  0.013*** 0.018  -0.107**  -0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.017] [0.043] [0.001] 
Migrant Network*No. of 
Adult  Males          -0.015 
          [0.024] 
Gini*No. of Adult Males            0.092*** 
          [0.013] 
Village  Fixed  Effects  No No  No No  No Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variables are as described in tables 1-5. The regression coefficients refer to Tables 1-5, columns 2 
The first stage for migrant household uses the school enrollment sample. 
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  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)   
Age (years)  -0.187*  -0.549  1.510** -0.044**  -5.776***  -0.035 
  [0.103] [0.489] [0.643] [0.022] [1.994] [0.057] 
Age2 0.006*  0.023  -0.043*  0.003***  0.345***  0.001 
  [0.004] [0.020] [0.024] [0.001] [0.091] [0.002] 
Father's Education   0.011***  0.003 0.069*** -0.003  -0.263*  0.001 
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.020] [0.002] [0.147] [0.002] 
Mother's Education  0.005  -0.012 0.031  -0.009**  -0.805***  0.002 
  [0.005] [0.007] [0.035] [0.004] [0.251] [0.004] 
No. of  Siblings 0-5  -0.019  -0.005  -0.163*  -0.004 -0.135 -0.009 
  [0.018] [0.030] [0.094] [0.008] [0.627] [0.008] 
No. of Siblings 0-5 *Boy  0.032 0.042  0.06 0.025*  -0.111  -0.003 
  [0.021] [0.038] [0.128] [0.014] [1.073] [0.011] 
No. of Sibling 6-17   0  -0.006  0.028  -0.008  0.024  0.012** 
  [0.010] [0.015] [0.061] [0.006] [0.409] [0.005] 
Older Boy less than 18  -0.006  0.015  -0.173  0.032*  0.966  -0.031* 
  [0.034] [0.042] [0.185] [0.019] [1.567] [0.017] 
Older Girl less than 18  0.001 -0.097* 0.039  0.014 1.174 0.007 
  [0.033] [0.049] [0.195] [0.021] [1.775] [0.017] 
Dependency  Ratio    -0.019  -0.036  0.202  -0.053*** -1.796 -0.038*** 
  [0.030] [0.043] [0.171] [0.018] [1.483] [0.012] 
Indicator for Joint Family  -0.045  -0.027 -0.029  0.078**  8.909***  -0.058*** 
  [0.045] [0.069] [0.262] [0.035] [3.367] [0.018] 
Inherited land (acres)  0.002  0  0.007  0.005**  0.283  -0.002*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.020] [0.002] [0.180] [0.001] 
Migrant Network*Indicator 
for No. of Adult Males            -0.532*** 
         [0.040] 
Gini*No. of Adult Males            -0.079*** 
         [0.014] 
Village  Fixed  Effects  No No  No No  No Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variables are as described in tables 1-5. The regression coefficients refer to Table7, columns 2, 4 and 
7 and Table 8, columns 2 and 4. The first stage for female head uses the school enrollment sample. 
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